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 1075 
CONFOUNDED COLLECTORS, CONFUSED 
CONSUMERS: TIME TO CLOSE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
ON WHETHER THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION 
PRACTICES ACT REQUIRES A CONSUMER TO 
DISPUTE A DEBT IN WRITING 
Daniel O’Connell+ 
The consumer credit industry is growing1 and a third of adults with credit 
histories have debt in collections.2  Collections can linger on credit reports for 
years, causing financial harm.3  Financial stress from the recent recession has 
increased delinquency4 and consumers have seen a reversion to many of the 
abuses the last century’s consumer protection legislation was designed to end.5  
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 1. See DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW § 1:1 
(2014–2015 ed. 2014).  By June 2007, consumer credit outstanding in the United States exceeded 
$2.4 trillion and was increasing at an annual rate of six percent.  Id.  A significant proportion of this 
debt is credit card debt.  Id. 
 2. Jeanne Sahadi, 1 in 3 U.S. Adults Have Debt “in Collections,” CNN MONEY (July 29, 
2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/07/29/pf/debt-collections/ (according to an Urban Institute 
study). 
 3. See Annamaria Adriotis, FICO Recalibrates its Credit Scores, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7,  
2014, 7:54 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/fico-recalibrates-its-credit-scores-1407443549.  
Collections can remain on credit reports for up to seven years and can lower credit scores as much 
as one hundred points, saddling consumers with high interest rates or preventing them from being 
able to access credit.  Id.  Fair Isaac Corp.’s recent decision to exclude paid and settled collections 
from its credit scores should significantly ameliorate this problem for some consumers.  Id. 
 4. See Matthew R. Bremner, Note, The Need for Reform in the Age of Financial Chaos, 76 
BROOK. L. REV. 1553, 1574–75 (2011) (noting that “lingering hallmarks of the recession” such as 
“high unemployment rates, low wages, and depressed property values” make consumers “more 
likely to default on their loan obligations”) (footnotes omitted). 
 5. See id. at 1577–78 (noting that “many of the abuses about which consumers currently 
complain,” such as harassing phone calls, “hounding debtors at their workplaces,” and threats of 
arrest and physical violence, “are the very same abuses that the [Fair Debt Collection Practices Act] 
was originally enacted to eradicate”). 
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Consumers should have a clear picture of their rights in collections, especially 
because erroneous collection notices have become increasingly common.6 
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), enacted by the U.S. 
Congress in 1977 and codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p to combat abusive 
collection practices,7 acknowledges that consumers need recourse when debt 
collectors try to collect debts in error.8  Section 1692g contains a mechanism for 
consumers to validate debts (the “validation mechanism”).9  Section 1692g(a)(3) 
provides that a debt collector must notify the consumer that it will assume a debt 
to be valid (the “1692g notice”) unless the consumer challenges the debt within 
thirty days of receiving such notice (the “thirty-day period”). 10   Section 
1692g(a)(3) does not explicitly require a consumer to challenge a debt in 
writing11 and a circuit split has emerged on the question of whether the section 
requires the challenge in writing.12 
The Third Circuit held in Graziano v. Harrison13 that § 1692g(a)(3) implies a 
writing requirement because such a requirement would promote statutory 
consistency and reduce debt collector-consumer conflict.14  The Third Circuit 
recently upheld Graziano in Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group.15  
Conversely, in Camacho v. Bridgeport Financial, Inc.,16 the Ninth Circuit held 
                                                 
 6. Kathy M. Kristof, When Debt Collectors Go After the Wrong Person, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 
19, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/19/business/la-fi-perfin-20101219.  Erroneous 
collection notices have become more common in recent years because “banks and credit card 
companies are increasingly selling debt for pennies on the dollar.”  Id. 
 7. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a), (e) (2012).  Congress passed the FDCPA to curb “abusive, 
deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices” that “contribute to . . . personal bankruptcies, to 
marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.”  Id. 
 8. See Elwin Griffith, The Role of Validation and Communication in the Debt Collection 
Process, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 429, 433 (2010) (remarking that the FDCPA “responds to the 
possibility that the collector may be pursuing the wrong person or seeking to collect a debt that the 
consumer has already paid”). 
 9. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2012). 
 10. Id. § 1692g(a)(3). 
 11. Compare § 1692g(a)(4)–(5), (b) (explicitly requiring writings), with § 1692g(a)(3) 
(providing only that unless a consumer “within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the 
validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt 
collector”). 
 12. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that there is a writing 
requirement.  See Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 709 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 
2013); Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 1991).  The Fourth, Second, and Ninth 
Circuits have held that there is not a writing requirement.  See Clark v. Absolute Collection Serv., 
Inc., 741 F.3d 487, 491 (4th Cir. 2014); Hooks v. Forman, Holt, Eliades & Ravin, LLC, 717 F.3d 
282, 286 (2d Cir. 2013); Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 430 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2005), 
vacated on other grounds, 523 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 13. 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 14. Id. at 112. 
 15. Caprio, 709 F.3d at 146. 
 16. 430 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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that § 1692g(a)(3) permits oral disputes under a plain language reading of the 
FDCPA.17  The Second Circuit in Hooks v. Forman, Holt, Eliades & Ravin, 
LLC18 held that § 1692g(a)(3) permits oral disputes under a tiered scheme of 
rights.19   Most recently, in Clark v. Absolute Collection Service, Inc.,20  the 
Fourth Circuit held that § 1692g(a)(3) permits oral disputes on a plain language 
basis.21 
This Comment examines the circuit split on whether § 1692g(a)(3) contains a 
writing requirement and proposes a solution to the divide.  Part I examines the 
development of the consumer credit industry in the United States, abuses within 
that industry, and federal legislation to curb those abuses.  Part II discusses the 
reasoning of the courts involved in the circuit split.  Part III analyzes and weighs 
the reasoning of the divided circuits, finding merits to both sides of the conflict.  
Part IV proposes amending § 1692g(a)(3) to explicitly permit oral and written 
disputes while requiring debt collectors to include a disclaimer about the distinct 
effects of oral and written disputes in the 1692g notice. 
I.  USURY TO UTILITY: CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE FDCPA 
Credit is one of the hallmarks of a modern and prosperous society.22  While 
the practice of taking on debt to finance purchases was once a burden to be 
avoided, debt is now a central part of the American consumer economy.23  The 
popularity of buying goods and services now and paying later has its roots in the 
rise of discretionary income, the middle class, consumerism, and 
suburbanization.24  Between the early 1950s and early 1960s, the number of 
Americans who maintained a favorable view of installment payments increased 
from fifty to sixty percent.25  The debt collection industry grew with the use of 
consumer credit, with businesses assigning debts to debt collectors where they 
lacked the resources to pursue collections themselves.26  Debt collections are 
now a large and important part of the American economy: in 2005, 6,500 
collection services reclaimed $40 billion in debt for clients.27 
                                                 
 17. Id. at 1081. 
 18. 717 F.3d 282 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 19. Id. at 286. 
 20. 741 F.3d 487 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 21. Id. at 491. 
 22. See David Caplovitz, Consumer Credit in the Affluent Society, in CONSUMER CREDIT 
REFORM 3, 3 (Clark C. Havighurst ed., 1970). 
 23. See id. at 3–4. 
 24. Id. at 5–6. 
 25. Id. at 4 (referencing the work of George Katona at Michigan’s Survey Research Center 
who conducted early research on public opinion of consumer finance). 
 26. William P. Hoffman, Comment, Recapturing the Congressional Intent Behind the Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 549, 557 (2010). 
 27. Id. 
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A.  Development of Consumer Credit 
Consumers use many credit and debt instruments to finance today’s purchases 
with promises of tomorrow’s payment, including mortgages, student loans, 
credit cards, and car loans.28  However, the use of consumer credit was not as 
widespread before the twentieth century.29  Most Americans’ lifestyles and jobs 
did not allow them to acquire a high standard of living, so they had little use for 
consumer credit.30  However, there were certain applications of consumer credit 
prior to the mass market consumerism of the mid- to late–twentieth century: 
consumers generally bought expensive goods, such as sewing machines, on 
installment plans,31 and farmers who were worried about their finances could 
obtain credit by trading future earnings on crops to local merchants.32 
Consumer finance regulation, to the extent that it existed, consisted mostly of 
usury laws with religious origins stretching back to the middle ages that 
established interest rates at approximately six percent.33  In the United States, 
these usury laws first appeared in the colonies,34 and they remained dominant 
even until 1900.35 
While usury laws sought to provide a measure of protection to borrowers by 
preventing lenders from subjecting them to excessive interest rates,36 they could 
have the opposite effect by driving borrowers to illegal markets and 
unscrupulous lenders to obtain credit.37   Usury laws inhibited credit access 
                                                 
 28. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., QUARTERLY REPORT ON HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND CREDIT 
1 (Nov. 2012), http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/national_economy/householdcredit/District 
Report_Q32012.pdf. 
 29. See HOMER KRIPKE, CONSUMER CREDIT: TEXT-CASES-MATERIALS 1–2 (1970).  
According to Kripke, “in the 19th century society . . . there was almost no personal property of 
enduring value. . . . [Consumer financing] was limited to a few sewing machines, pianos, and sets 
of books, and it was neither significant in the economy nor a significant social problem.”  Id. 
 30. BARBARA A. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 1 (1970) (relating 
that “credit could be more usefully employed in capital-producing enterprises” and that “[t]he real 
wages of the working man were sufficient to acquire little more than a subsistence-level standard 
of living”). 
 31. Caplovitz, supra note 22, at 4.  See also NAT’L COMM’N ON CONSUMER FIN., CONSUMER 
CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1972) (explaining how one colonial-era furniture manufacturer 
made almost all of its sales on credit). 
 32. NAT’L COMM’N ON CONSUMER FIN., supra note 31, at 5. 
 33. See KRIPKE, supra note 29, at 2 (explaining that the medieval Church believed charging 
interest “beyond a fair price,” usually six percent, was immoral). 
 34. Walter D. Malcolm & John J. Curtin, Jr., The New Federal Attack on the Loan Shark 
Problem, in CONSUMER CREDIT REFORM 127, 130 (Clark C. Havighurst ed., 1970) (explaining that 
usury laws in the United States extend back to simple colonial usury statutes from around 1641). 
 35. See Paul R. Moo, Legislative Control of Consumer Credit, in CONSUMER CREDIT 
REFORM 18, 18–19 (Clark C. Havighurst ed., 1970). 
 36. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 37. See William D. Warren, Consumer Credit Law: Rates, Costs, and Benefits, 27 STAN. L. 
REV. 951, 952–53 (1975).  See also KRIPKE, supra note 29, at 2–3 (describing a transaction typical 
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because those with few assets seeking small amounts could not obtain credit.38  
Therefore, many borrowers turned to illegal lenders 39  utilizing exorbitant 
interest rates. 40   Illegal lending and borrowing practices were widespread 
enough that by 1900, most major American cities were home to illegal loan-
makers.41 
Debt collectors hired by creditors to pursue those falling behind on their 
obligations could use “virtually any tactic” during this early period, and creditors 
could financially ruin delinquent debtors by forcing them into bankruptcy.42  
Methods of persuasion utilized by creditors against delinquent debtors included 
the seizure of the debtor’s property, wage garnishment, and in some cases 
imprisonment.43  According to one scholar, the ease of debt recovery—and the 
forceful tactics implied by such ease of operation—made debt collectors “feared 
and hated” among their targets.44 
In 1898, following a financial crisis in 1893, Congress passed the Bankruptcy 
Act to allow voluntary bankruptcy.45  The reforms increased creditors’ reliance 
on debt collectors as bankruptcy made it harder to reclaim minor debts.46 
At the turn of the twentieth century, lawmakers recognized the limitations 
imposed by usury laws and started passing exceptions to these laws.47  For 
example, some states licensed lenders to offer small, high-interest loans that 
would not have been previously available on the legal market.48  In 1910, an 
attorney named Arthur J. Morris pioneered a financial instrument called the 
“Morris Plan” which allowed lenders to increase their loan yields by making 
loans in exchange for a consumer’s monthly purchases of investment certificates 
to be applied to the consumer’s debt.49  In 1916, the Russell Sage Foundation 
                                                 
of loansharks of the usury law era where they made $5 loans at the beginning of the week in 
exchange for $6 repaid at the end of the week). 
 38. See Warren, supra note 37. 
 39. Id. at 953.  See also KRIPKE, supra note 29, at 2–3 (stating that since “the cost of handling 
depends on the size of the loan, and the amount involved in consumer credit is typically small” and 
“an important element of cost is the expense of handling the number of collections and related 
accounting entries,” credit was not always available to ordinary wage earners).  Workers seeking 
credit from illegal loan sharks dealt with annual interest rates as high as 1,000 percent.  Id. at 3. 
 40. KRIPKE, supra note 29, at 3. 
 41. NAT’L COMM’N ON CONSUMER FIN., supra note 31, at 5. 
 42. Lauren Goldberg, Note, Dealing in Debt: The High-Stakes World of Debt Collection After 
FDCPA, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 711, 714 (2006). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 715. 
 46. Id.  Voluntary bankruptcy by consumers was irksome to debt collectors because 
consumers could “discharge all of their debts” once creditors attempted to collect on them.  Id. 
 47. Warren, supra note 37, at 953. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Moo, supra note 35, at 19. 
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drafted the Universal Small Loan Act (USLA) to regulate consumer credit while 
preventing loansharking.50  Many states adopted the USLA during the 1920s and 
1930s, along with laws permitting loans by industrial banks under Morris 
Plans.51 
The collection industry grew as consumers began to utilize credit more widely 
as a means of financing purchases.52  This led companies to hire collection 
agents to recover debts in increasing numbers, in exchange for a return on 
recovered funds, where in-house collection was financially inefficient.53  As 
consumers bought more goods and services on credit and experienced more 
delinquencies, the first professional debt collection firms began to form in 
earnest.54  The potential for abuse by debt collectors became especially apparent 
during the Great Depression, when lenders who were “desperate” to recover 
debts often hired shady debt collectors.55 
Consumer credit first became widely available after World War II,56  and 
consumers commonly used credit financing by the 1960s. 57   Outstanding 
consumer credit increased from $21.5 billion to $137.2 billion between 1950 and 
1971.58  Yet consumer credit regulation remained a “complex tangle” of state 
regulations,59 usually supplemented by statutory law and common law60 and 
disparately enforced.61  There was little federal consumer protection legislation 
outside of established interest rates for certain deposit accounts and regulations 
                                                 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.  Commercial banks generally did not make loans until the Great Depression, when 
business loan sources dried up.  Id. at 20. 
 52. Goldberg, supra note 42, at 715–16. 
 53. Id.  Collecting outstanding debt was especially hard on small businesses, which often had 
to increase prices or conduct layoffs to make up for lost funds.  Id. at 715. 
 54. Id. at 716. 
 55. Id.  Goldberg noted that because “collectors only made money if the debt was recovered, 
they had an incentive to squeeze every possible dollar out of the debtor.”  Id.  She also observed 
that “[v]icious tactics were so effective that reputable companies found it difficult to compete with 
‘rogue agencies.’”  Id. at 717. 
 56. See Moo, supra note 35, at 21. 
 57. CURRAN, supra note 30, at 1–2. 
 58. NAT’L COMM’N ON CONSUMER FIN., supra note 31, at 5. 
 59. Paul A. Mondor, Comment, Lock-in Laws: Adding More Patches to the Mortgage 
Lending Quilt, 37 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 543, 545–46 (1988).  The decentralized nature of state 
consumer credit regulation was compounded by the fact that the regulatory “pattern var[ied] from 
one state to the next.”  Id. at 546. 
 60. Ralph J. Rohner, Multiple Sources of Consumer Law and Enforcement (Or: “Still in 
Search of a Uniform Policy”), 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 881, 882–83 (1992) (listing the Uniform 
Commercial Code and “state common law doctrines such as fraud, deceit and unconscionability” 
as examples of such supplementary regulation). 
 61. See id. (noting that “[e]nforcement . . . was typically split among licensing authorities, 
bank supervisors, [and] state attorneys”). 
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on national financial institutions.62  Although the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) was able to prosecute businesses for “unfair and deceptive practices,”63 it 
was forced to split its efforts between consumer protection and antitrust work 
and it could only pursue “enforcement actions in the public interest.”64 
Problems related to consumer credit, such as repossession, grew with the use 
of consumer credit.65  Some states responded to these problems with interest rate 
caps.66  In 1964, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws started assembling a Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC)67 repealing 
usury laws, interest rate caps on commercial transactions, and competitive 
barriers.68  Released in 1968 and revised and reissued in 1974, the UCCC was 
adopted by only a few states.69  In 1965, the American Bar Foundation launched 
a study of laws applicable to consumer credit.70  The National Consumer Law 
Center (NCLC), part of the U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity, published a 
National Consumer Act (NCA) in 1970 and Model Consumer Credit Act in 
1973.71  Several states adopted parts on the NCA.72 
With increased attention on consumer finance regulation, Congress passed a 
string of consumer protection laws between 1968 and 1980.73  The Consumer 
Credit Protection Act (CCPA), passed in 1968, was a revolutionary piece of 
national legislation aimed at regulating consumer credit.74  The original CCPA’s 
                                                 
 62. See id. 
 63. Mark E. Budnitz, The Development of Consumer Protection Law, the Institutionalization 
of Consumerism, and Future Prospects and Perils, 26 GA. ST. L. REV. 1147, 1164 (2010).  
President Richard Nixon “reorganized the FTC” to increase its effectiveness, and Congress 
“granted the FTC broad rulemaking authority . . . .”  Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. at 1149–50. 
 66. Warren, supra note 37, at 955.  Voters supported rate caps and legislators liked them 
because they gave them “enormous leverage over a giant industry.”  Id.  Washington passed a 
twelve percent interest rate cap on retail credit in 1968 by popular referendum and California turned 
down by popular referendum a ballot measure that struck “the state’s constitutional 10 percent 
interest limitation on loans of more than $100,000 made to corporations and partnerships.”  Id. 
 67. Id. at 964–65. 
 68. Id. at 965. 
 69. Rohner, supra note 60, at 883. 
 70. Moo, supra note 35, at 23. 
 71. Warren, supra note 37, at 965.  Unlike the UCCC, the NCLC’s legislation “takes no 
position on . . . usury laws, and its posture on [competitive] barriers . . . seems equivocal.”  Id. at 
966.  See also Budnitz, supra note 63, at 1150–51 (explaining that the Office of Economic 
Opportunity was created by President Lyndon B. Johnson as part of the War on Poverty). 
 72. Budnitz, supra note 63, at 1156–57. 
 73. Rohner, supra note 60, at 884–85.  This trend began to slow with deregulation in the 
1980s.  Id. at 885. 
 74. THOMAS A. DURKIN & GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN, TRUTH IN LENDING: THEORY, 
HISTORY, AND A WAY FORWARD 1–2 (2011). 
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most significant component was the Truth in Lending Act,75 which required 
lenders to disclose credit terms and banned “extortionate credit transactions.”76  
Subsequent legislation included the Fair Credit Reporting Act in 1970, the Fair 
Credit Billing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act in 1974, and the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act Amendments in 1976.77 
B.  The FDCPA: Passage, Main Functions, and Interpretation 
While the use of consumer credit became more mainstream, problems 
stemming from debt collector abuses persisted.78  Examples of such abuses 
include a lender telephoning a man’s relatives to inform them of his debt,79 a 
loan company employee haranguing a debtor at a public bus stop about a 
delinquency,80 and a lender harassing a debtor’s landlady in an effort to exact 
payment from her tenant.81  Federal law prohibited threatening mailings, state 
criminal laws barred certain harassment, and consumers could sue debt 
collectors for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.82  In the 1954 Texas Supreme Court case Duty v. General Finance 
Co., 83  the plaintiffs were subjected to daily harassing telephone and mail 
correspondence from a collection agency.84  The court chastised debt collectors 
engaged in abusive conduct, holding that a debt collector is liable to a debtor 
when it uses “cruel device[s]” in the course of a collection and causes the debtor 
“great mental anguish.”85 
Yet it was difficult to enforce state laws against out-of-state actors86 and the 
CCPA did not apply to “third-party” collection agencies.87  By 1977, abusive 
collection tactics gained lawmakers’ attention, as debt collection had become a 
national industry with 5,000 collection agencies nationwide, buying $5 billion 
                                                 
 75. Id. at 2. 
 76. Id.  Malcolm & Curtin, supra note 34, at 127 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 77. Rohner, supra note 60, at 884. 
 78. See Thomas C. Homburger, Harassment of Borrowers by Licensed Lenders, 1 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 39, 39 (1965) (explaining that “[w]hile the problem of loan sharking receives 
periodic publicity . . . harassment by legitimate, licensed lenders—remains less widely known”). 
 79. Id. at 45. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 48–49; KRIPKE, supra note 29, at 322. 
 83. 273 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. 1954). 
 84. Id. at 65. 
 85. Id. at 66.  The court also stated that “[n]o such business concerns or ethical professional 
men will ever be guilty of such outrageous conduct.”  Id. at 66. 
 86. Hoffman, supra note 24, at 552.  See also John Tavormina, Comment, The Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act: The Consumer’s Answer to Abusive Collection Practices, 52 TUL. L. REV. 
584, 586 (1978) (remarking that “the states’ inability to control interstate debt collection 
accentuates the necessity for federal legislation”). 
 87. See Hoffman, supra note 26, at 552. 
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in debt and contacting more than eight million consumers annually.88  Positive 
incentives for abusive practices aggravated the situation—debt collectors could 
earn high commissions and did not expect future contact with their targets, and 
thus had little need to cultivate goodwill. 89   During FDCPA hearings, one 
witness recounted her employer telling her “all debtors are liars and thieves” and 
“the pride of a good agency collector is the effective use of scare tactics.”90  
Some states had no laws on collection; others had few or ineffective laws.91 
Telephonic technology increased the ability of debt collectors to operate 
across state lines.92  Most of those individuals targeted by debt collectors were 
ordinary people who had fallen on hard times rather than “deadbeats.” 93  
Congress sought to protect consumers from unfair collection practices,94 finding 
that consumers suffered from such practices,95 and existing laws did not do 
enough to protect them.96  In drafting the FDCPA, Congress had the backing of 
consumer advocacy groups, labor unions, and even trade associations 
representing debt collectors concerned that unethical debt collectors were 
gaining the upper hand over honest debt collectors in the marketplace.97 
Many of the practices outlawed by the FDCPA were prohibited in some 
nascent form by parts of other laws, such as the FTC’s power to prosecute unfair 
or deceptive practices, the Communications Act of 1934’s ban on abusive 
telephone communications, and the U.S. Postal Service’s power to prosecute 
                                                 
 88. See S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 2 (1977). 
 89. Id.  Collection agencies in 1977 usually earned fifty percent on collections, often leading 
them to “collect by any means.”  Id. 
 90. Elwin Griffith, Identifying Some Trouble Spots in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: 
A Framework for Improvement, 83 NEB. L. REV. 762, 762 n.1 (2005).  The witness went on to 
testify that “[i]t was not unusual to hear a collector inform the debtor that unless the bill was paid, 
they would be unable to receive medical services at any hospital, or that they had better nail their 
possessions to the floor before the law came and removed everything they owned.”  Id. at 762–63 
n.1. 
 91. S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 2 (1977).  Approximately eighty million Americans—forty percent 
of the population in 1977—were left vulnerable to abuse by debt collectors because of this gap in 
consumer protection legislation.  Id. 
 92. Id. at 2–3 (stating that “[t]he use of [Wide Area Telephone Service] lines by debt 
collectors has led to a dramatic increase in interstate collections” and “[s]tate officials are unable 
to act against unscrupulous debt collectors who harass consumers from another State”). 
 93. Id. at 3.  Just four percent of debtors in default “fit the description of ‘deadbeat’” and 
“willful refusal to pay” was an uncommon reason for default.  Id.  Rather, “unemployment, 
overextension, serious illness, or marital difficulties” are often to blame.  Id.  The Senate committee 
noted that “there is universal agreement among scholars, law enforcement officials, and even debt 
collectors that the number of persons who willfully refuse to pay just debts is minuscule.”  Id. 
 94. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012).  Congress also sought to ensure fair debt collectors were not 
competitively disadvantaged by unfair collectors and promote “consistent State action to protect 
consumers” against abusive collection practices.  Id. 
 95. Id. § 1692(a). 
 96. Id. § 1692(b). 
 97. Hoffman, supra note 26, at 551–52. 
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debt collectors engaged in mail fraud.98  Opponents of the FDCPA argued that 
Congress was intruding on state power.99   However, because Congress had 
already taken over state functions with the Consumer Protection Act, the 
FDCPA “merely supplement[ed] previously existing legislation[,]” leaving 
states to “structure [their own consumer protection] laws pursuant to the 
guidelines of the [FDCPA].”100 
The FDCPA draws authority from Congress’s power to regulate interstate 
commerce. 101   It bans many abusive practices, such as threats, harassment, 
impersonating attorneys and government officials, misrepresenting debtors’ 
rights, producing deceptive documents, and suing debtors outside of the place of 
contracting or the debtor’s area of residence. 102   The law also contains a 
provision that allows debtors to validate debts to “eliminate the recurring 
problem of debt collectors dunning the wrong person or attempting to collect 
debts [that have] already [been] paid.”103 
The FTC administers the FDCPA in order to ensure compliance with the law 
and punish “unfair or deceptive act[s] or practice[s].”104  The FDCPA has the 
power to subject debt collectors in violation of the law to civil liability for 
noncompliance.105  In making a determination as to a debt collector’s liability, 
courts will consider the nature, frequency, and persistence of the noncompliance, 
and whether the debt collector intended to violate the act.106  In class actions, 
courts will also consider the debt collector’s resources and the number of 
individuals harmed by its actions.107 
The FDCPA is a “self-enforcing” law108 in the sense that it allows consumers 
a “private right of action” 109  to sue debt collectors for up to $1,000 for a 
violation.110  While the FTC can seek greater damages than private plaintiffs, 
and is often successful in its enforcement efforts, it brings few cases every year 
                                                 
 98. Tavormina, supra note 86, at 584–85.  While some would argue these federal legal 
protections would have eliminated the need for the FDCPA, such critics “fail[] to consider the 
societal benefits derived from statutorily defining the rights and obligations of the concerned 
parties.”  Id. at 585. 
 99. Id. at 586–87. 
 100. Id. at 587. 
 101. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(d) (2012). 
 102. Id. §§ 1692d, 1692e, 1692i, 1692j. 
 103. S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 4 (1977).  “Dunning” is an archaic word for demanding payment 
from a delinquent debtor.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 612 (10th ed. 2014). 
 104. 15 U.S.C. § 1692l(a) (2012). 
 105. Id. § 1692k(a). 
 106. Id. § 1692k(b)(1). 
 107. Id. § 1692k(b)(2). 
 108. Tavormina, supra note 86, at 598. 
 109. Rex C. Anderson, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: A Law Needing Updating?, MICH. 
B. J. 28, 28 (2010). 
 110. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (2012). 
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under the law.111  The FTC is statutorily required to deliver annual reports and 
recommendations to Congress about the FDCPA.112  The FTC has seen a large 
spike in FDCPA-related complaints from consumers, witnessing a thirty-four 
percent increase in FDCPA complaints between 2004 and 2008.113  Consumers 
have also widely utilized the law’s private right of action in recent years, as the 
number of lawsuits filed each year under the FDCPA increased 250 percent from 
2007 to 2010.114 
Defenses available to debt collectors under the FDCPA include the debt 
collector’s commission of an unintentional bona fide error despite “procedures 
reasonably adapted to avoid [the] error” 115  as well as the commission of 
violating acts otherwise done in good faith under the FTC’s advisement.116  
However, in Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA,117 the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that the bona fide error defense does not apply to 
mistakes of law.118  The dissent in Jerman feared this would increase FDCPA 
suits based on technical violations.119   Most courts interpret the FDCPA to 
protect the “least sophisticated consumer,”120 a standard which covers “even the 
                                                 
 111. Bremner, supra note 4, at 1563 (explaining that while the FTC can obtain damages of 
$16,000 for each person for each violation, it prosecutes just a few cases each year). 
 112. 15 U.S.C. § 1692m(a) (2012); Tavormina, supra note 86, at 599. 
 113. Colin Hector, Comment, Debt Collection in the Information Age: New Technologies and 
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1601, 1609 (2011). 
 114. Bremner, supra note 4, at 1554.  According to Bremner, “[t]he financial crisis of 2008, 
the slow economic recovery, the lingering high unemployment rate, the high consumer default rate, 
and the increased motivation of banks and credit card companies to sell off delinquent accounts to 
third-party debt collectors” are contributing factors to this significant increase in consumer-debt 
collector conflict.  Id. at 1554–55. 
 115. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2012). 
 116. Id. § 1692k(e). 
 117. 1305 S. Ct. 1605 (2010). 
 118. Id. at 1624.  The Court noted that “when Congress has intended to provide a mistake-of-
law defense to civil liability, it has often done so more explicitly.”  Id. at 1612. 
 119. Id. at 1631 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that “[t]oday’s holding gives new impetus to 
[an] already troubling dynamic of allowing certain actors in the system to spin even good-faith, 
technical violations of federal law into lucrative litigation” and punishing those who make honest 
compliance errors in spite of “reasonable efforts . . . to avoid mistakes”). 
 120. Richard D. Gage, Note, A Remedy Foreclosed? Mortgage Foreclosure and the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 283, 289 (2012).  See e.g. Brown v. Card Serv. 
Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that “[b]ecause the FDCPA is a remedial statute, 
we construe its language broadly, so as to effect its purpose”) (internal citation omitted); Clark v. 
Capital Credit & Collection Serv., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Sec. Pac. 
Nat’l Bank v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 63 F.3d 900, 904 (9th Cir. 1995)) (stating that a court “must 
avoid a construction which renders any language of the [FDCPA] superfluous”). 
1086 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 64:1075 
naïve and the trusting.”121  The FDCPA is generally seen as a “remedial” law 
that ought to be interpreted “broadly” to protect consumers.122 
It is difficult to ascertain from the FDCPA’s legislative history whether 
Congress intended to impute a writing requirement in § 1692g(a)(3).  In a 
Committee on Banking, Currency and Housing report analyzing the house bill 
published on June 1, 1976, the Committee said of the validation provision that 
“unless the consumer . . . disputes the validity of the debt, the debt will be 
assumed as valid . . . and . . . if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing 
[collections] shall cease.” 123   In contrast, there is a statement in the 
Congressional Record from July 1976 that makes no distinction as to a separate 
writing requirement: “[a]fter initial communication from the debt collector, this 
bill requires . . . a statement that the consumer must dispute the validity of the 
debt within 30 days, or the debt will be assumed valid.  Where the debt is 
disputed, collection[s] must stop.”124 
While the June 1, 1976 report apparently distinguishes between written and 
unwritten disputes, evidence in the Congressional Record from July 1976 does 
not.125  However, the FDCPA was amended in 1986, 1996, and 2006.126  The 
2006 amendments are of particular significance because they revised § 1692g(b) 
to state that debt collectors may continue collections during the thirty-day period 
unless consumers lodge a written dispute. 127   In this relatively recent 
amendment, Congress seems to acknowledge that there might be a distinction 
between a dispute made in writing and an oral dispute.128  Additionally, the FTC 
encouraged Congress to amend § 1692g(a)(3) to clearly permit oral disputes in 
its 2005 annual report.129 
                                                 
 121. Hector, supra note 113, at 1607.  See also Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., 
LLC, 709 F.3d 142, 149 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354 
(3d Cir. 2000)) (reckoning that the “least sophisticated debtor” standard assumes that a debtor may 
be less than “reasonable,” but more than “willfully blind or non-observant”). 
 122. See supra note 120. 
 123. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1202, at 10 (1976) (emphasis added). 
 124. 122 CONG. REC. H7785–7798, 369 (1976). 
 125. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 94-1202, at 10 (1976) (“[I]f the consumer notifies the debt 
collector in writing within the 30 day period . . . the debt collector shall cease collection.”) 
(emphasis added), with 122 CONG. REC. H7785–7798, 369 (1976) (“[T]he consumer must dispute 
the validity of the debt within 30 days . . . [w]here the debt is disputed, collection must stop.”). 
 126. Anderson, supra note 109, at 28. 
 127. Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351 § 802(c), 120 Stat. 
1966, 2006–07 (2006). 
 128. See id.  See also supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text. 
 129. U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2005: FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES 
ACT 12, 18–19 (2005).  The FTC stated that, “[w]e believe Sections 807(8) and 809(a)(3) should 
be amended to expressly provide that consumers may trigger their protections by orally notifying 
collectors that they dispute a debt.”  Id. at 19.  The FTC argued that this would “assure consistency 
between the [FDCPA’s validation mechanism] and the standard imposed by analogous provisions 
of the [Fair Credit Reporting Act].”  Id.  Moreover, the FTC argued that “public policy also favors” 
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II.  CIRCUITS SPLIT ON A WRITING REQUIREMENT IN § 1692G(A)(3) 
A.  The Validation Mechanism 
Under the validation mechanism, the debt collector must send the consumer a 
written notice with certain information about the debt and the consumer’s 
FDCPA rights (the 1692g notice) within five days of first communicating with 
the consumer about a collection.130  Sections 1692g(a)(1)–(2) require that this 
notice provide the sum of the debt and the creditor’s name.131 
The notice must also inform the consumer that the debt “will be assumed to 
be valid” by the debt collector unless challenged within thirty days of receiving 
the 1692g notice (the thirty-day period).132  Section 1692g(a)(4) states that the 
notice must inform the consumer that the debt collector will send proof of the 
debt or a judgment on it if the consumer challenges the debt in writing within 
the thirty day period.133  Section 1692g(a)(5) states that the notice must inform 
the consumer that the debt collector will send the consumer the name and address 
of the original creditor upon written request made within the thirty day period.134  
Section 1692g(b) states that if a consumer makes a written dispute under § 
1692g(a)(3) or invokes § 1692g(a)(5), the debt collector must cease collection 
until it can verify the debt.135  Otherwise, collections may continue.136  Section 
1692g(a)(4)–(5) and the § 1692g(b) cease-collection provision require writings, 
but § 1692g(a)(3) does not explicitly require a consumer to dispute a debt in 
writing to avoid the debt collector’s presumption of the debt’s validity.137 
B.  Circuit Court Decisions 
The Third Circuit in Graziano v. Harrison138 was the first circuit to address 
whether § 1692g(a)(3) permits an oral dispute to prevent a debt collector from 
assuming a debt’s validity. 139   Harrison, an attorney with a debt collection 
                                                 
allowing oral disputes.  Id.  Section 809(a)(3) of the FDCPA is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3).  
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 809(a)(3), 91 Stat. 874 (1977); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692g(a)(3) (2012). 
 130. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2012). 
 131. Id. § 1692g(a)(1)–(2). 
 132. Id. § 1692g(a)(3). 
 133. Id. § 1692g(a)(4). 
 134. Id. § 1692g(a)(5). 
 135. Id. § 1692g(b). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 138. 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 139. See Sturdevant v. Jolas, 942 F. Supp. 426, 429 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (noting that the Third 
Circuit had been the only federal appellate court up until that time to have ruled on whether the 
FDCPA requires a debtor to dispute a debt in writing). 
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business, sent a collection notice to Graziano.140  The notice informed Graziano 
that Harrison would assume the debt was valid unless he challenged the debt in 
writing within thirty days.141  Graziano sued Harrison for a number of FDCPA 
violations, among them that Harrison’s writing requirement violated the 
FDCPA.142  On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court upheld 
the writing requirement.143 
On appeal, Graziano pointed out that several district courts interpreting § 
1692g(a)(3) found no requirement for a written dispute, 144  while Harrison 
argued that the presence of explicit writing requirements in § 1692g(a)(4)–(5) 
evidenced a congressional intent to create a writing requirement.145  The court 
held that Graziano’s interpretation of § 1692g “attribute[s] to Congress an intent 
to create [an] incoherent . . . system” where a debt collector would have no 
“statutory ground” for assuming a debt’s validity, yet would not need to verify 
the debt nor inform the consumer of the creditor’s identity, and could continue 
to collect the debt.146  The court also commented that requiring written disputes 
is preferable from a public policy and judicial efficiency standpoint because it 
creates a permanent documentation of a dispute that provides a bulkhead against 
future legal clashes.147 
The Third Circuit encountered § 1692g(a)(3) again in 2013 in Caprio v. 
Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, LLC. 148   Caprio filed a class action 
lawsuit against Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group (HRRG) alleging that 
HRRG violated the FDCPA with a collection letter inviting debtors to challenge 
                                                 
 140. Graziano, 950 F.2d at 109. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 110. 
 143. Id. at 111. 
 144. Id. at 112.  See, e.g. Young v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc., No. CIV-86-1121E, 1989 
WL 79054, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. July 17, 1989), modified, 729 F. Supp. 1421 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (“It is 
clear from these subsections that Congress was well aware of requiring the consumer to dispute the 
debt . . . in writing and, as such, the omission of the ‘in writing’ requirement in subsection (a)(3) 
appears to be intentional.”). 
 145. Graziano, 950 F.2d at 112. 
 146. Id.  The court noted that §1692g(a)(4) requires the debtor to make a written challenge to 
obtain verification of the debt, § 1692g(a)(5) states that the collector must furnish the debtor with 
the creditor’s identity upon written request, and § 1692g(b) provides that the collector must cease 
collection efforts upon a written dispute until he or she furnishes the debtor with proof of the debt’s 
validity.  Id. 
 147. Id. (noting that “a writing creates a lasting record of the fact that the debt has been 
disputed, and thus avoids a source of potential conflicts”). 
 148. 709 F.3d 142, 147, 151 (3d Cir. 2013) (upholding Graziano’s imposition of a writing 
requirement). 
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a debt in writing or orally.149  The district court granted HRRG’s motion for 
judgment on the pleadings.150 
On appeal, Caprio argued that HRRG’s letter violated the FDCPA because 
the recipient, presumed to be “the least sophisticated consumer,” would be under 
the impression that he could dispute his debt orally or in writing, making the 
letter a deceptive representation prohibited by § 1692(e)(10).151   The Third 
Circuit once again held that a debtor must dispute a debt in writing for the dispute 
to be valid.152  The court held that HRRG’s notice was “deceptive” because “‘it 
can be reasonably read to have two or more different meanings,’” one of which 
is not correct.153  The court held that under the least sophisticated consumer 
standard, a debt collector does not communicate an effective notice of rights to 
a consumer if the notice is contradictory.154 
In 2005, the Ninth Circuit, in Camacho v. Bridgeport Financial, Inc.,155 took 
an approach opposite to that of the Third Circuit on the question of whether § 
1692g(a)(3) implies a writing requirement, thereby creating a circuit split.156  
Camacho sued Bridgeport for FDCPA violations, including that Bridgeport 
allegedly misrepresented her rights under the FDCPA by requiring her to 
challenge her debt in writing.157  The trial court dismissed Bridgeport’s motion 
to dismiss, holding Camacho had a valid FDCPA claim and allowing an 
interlocutory appeal.158 
On appeal, Camacho argued that Bridgeport violated the FDCPA because § 
1692g(a)(3) does not include an explicit writing requirement.159  Bridgeport, 
meanwhile, argued that § 1692g(a)(3) should be construed as containing a 
writing requirement, lest it be inconsistent with the later subsections.160  The 
court held for Camacho, explaining that courts have a duty to abide by a statute’s 
                                                 
 149. Id. at 145–46.  The letter stated that, “[i]f we can answer any questions, or if you feel you 
do not owe this amount, please call us toll free . . . or write us at the above address.”  Id. at 145. 
 150. Id. at 146. 
 151. Id.  A “collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means 
in connection with the collection of any debt.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2012). 
 152. Caprio, 709 F.3d at 151. 
 153. Id. at 152 (quoting Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
 154. Caprio, 709 F.3d at 149, 151 (quoting Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 
1991)).  The court held that a letter overshadows or contradicts a validation notice if it “would make 
the least sophisticated consumer uncertain as to her rights,” and that “‘the juxtaposition of two 
inconsistent statements . . . render[s] the statutory notice invalid under section 1692g.’” Caprio, 
709 F.3d at 149, 152 (quoting Graziano, 950 F.2d at 111 and Russell, 74 F.3d at 35 respectively). 
 155. 30 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2005), vacated on other grounds, 523 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 156. Id. at 1081 (repudiating Graziano explicitly and holding that the FDCPA’s debt challenge 
provisions require written disputation). 
 157. Id. at 1079. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 1080. 
 160. Id. 
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plain meaning to the fullest extent possible.161  The court noted that the U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that a statute’s plain meaning is consistent with the 
statute if its plain meaning does “not alter the [statute’s] substance or obscure its 
meaning.”162  The Court also held that the result of allowing oral disputes would 
not create an “incoherent” system, as argued by Bridgeport, because the FDCPA 
provides consumer rights that are “triggered by an oral dispute.”163  Finally, the 
Ninth Circuit held that allowing a consumer to register an oral dispute would 
contribute to Congress’s intent by allowing a consumer to “question and respond 
to” a debt collector.164 
The Second Circuit joined the Ninth in Hooks v. Forman, Holt, Eliades & 
Ravin, LLC,165 holding that a consumer’s ability to challenge a debt is among 
“the most fundamental” rights under the FDCPA and should therefore be 
available to particularly disadvantaged debtors.166  The Second Circuit held that 
it is sensible in the general scheme of the FDCPA to allow debtors to dispute a 
debtor orally under § 1692g(a)(3) while requiring them to lodge complaints in 
writing under § 1692g(a)(4)–(5) and § 1692(b).167   The court came to this 
conclusion because although the power to require a debt collector to halt its 
collection efforts under § 1692g(b) gives consumers the “ultimate power” over 
collection agencies, the right to have payments go toward the undisputed part of 
a debt under § 1692h or to have the disputed status of the debt reported when the 
debt collector discusses the debt with others under § 1692e(8) burdens debt 
collectors less than other rights.168 
                                                 
 161. Id. at 1080–81. 
 162. Id. at 1081.  The Ninth Circuit noted that in Lamie v. United States, the Supreme Court 
held that “absent sufficient indications to the contrary, [courts] should refrain from inserting 
language into a statute, even if . . . inadvertently omitted . . . .”  Id. at 1081.  The Ninth Circuit also 
referenced the Supreme Court’s direction in Russello v. United States, which states that when 
Congress includes language in one part of a law but not another, there is a presumption that 
Congress acted with the intent to do so.  Id. (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 
(1983)). 
 163. Camacho, 430 F.3d at 1081–82.  The court provided as examples: § 1692e(8) (preventing 
a collector from transmitting credit information “without including the fact that the debt is in 
dispute”); § 1692h (preventing a collector from applying payments for debts not in dispute to a debt 
in dispute); and § 1692c(a)(1) (granting relief to a consumer communicating with him at an 
inconvenient time or location).  Id. at 1082. 
 164. Id. at 1082 (citing Swanson v. S. Or. Credit Serv., Inc., 869 F.2d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 
1989)). 
 165. 717 F.3d 282 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 166. Id. at 286 (noting that “it was reasonable to ensure that [the right to dispute a debt] could 
be exercised by consumer debtors who may have some difficulty with making a timely written 
challenge”). 
 167. Id. at 286.  The court stated that this configuration makes for a “sensible bifurcated 
scheme.”  Id. 
 168. Id. 
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Most recently, the Fourth Circuit joined the side of the split allowing oral 
disputes in Clark v. Absolute Collection Service, Inc.169  The Fourth Circuit held 
that there is no writing requirement in § 1692g(a)(3), asserting that “‘when the 
statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the 
disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its 
terms.’” 170  In addition, it would be improperly presumptive to read a writing 
requirement automatically into the FDCPA’s validation provision for oral debt 
disputes, thereby reading into the law “words that are not there.”171  The Fourth 
Circuit rejected the debt collector’s argument that excluding a writing 
requirement would be internally inconsistent with the FDCPA’s other debt 
resolution provisions.172 
C.  Intra-Circuit Splits: District Court Decisions 
The Seventh Circuit, in Sturdevant v. Jolas,173 deferred to Graziano in holding 
that a debt collector could require a consumer to challenge a debt in writing 
because it is necessary to look to § 1692g as a whole for the implication of a 
writing requirement and because of the “impracticality” of omitting a writing 
requirement.174  In Ingram v. Corporate Receivables, Inc.,175 a Seventh Circuit 
district court pointed to the fact that only the Third Circuit had ruled on the 
question to determine that a writing requirement should be implied to create a 
permanent record of a dispute and to avoid “undermin[ing]” the validation 
process by causing debtors to relinquish all of their other rights.176  In Castillo 
v. Carter,177 a Seventh Circuit district court held for the existence of a writing 
requirement, finding that the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Graziano was 
“persuasive.”178  The court noted that while the Seventh Circuit requires district 
                                                 
 169. 741 F.3d 487, 491 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 170. Id. at 491, 489–90 (quoting Lamie v. United States, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004)). 
 171. Clark, 741 F. 3d at 490. 
 172. Id. at 491.  The court found that § 1692g “triggers statutory protections for consumers” 
not tied to later sections with writing requirements and would not “lead to [an] absurd result.”  Id. 
 173. 942 F. Supp. 426 (W.D. Wis. 1996). 
 174. Id. at 429.  The Court found that the two cases cited by the plaintiff, Harvey v. United 
Adjusters, 509 F. Supp. 1218, 1220 (D. Or. 1980), and Reed v. Smith, No. 93-956-A-1, 1995 WL 
907764 (M.D. La. Feb. 7, 1995), failed to “thoroughly analyze[] the inherent writing requirement 
of subsection (a)(3) in connection with § 1692g(a) as a whole” and failed to consider “the 
impracticality of their holdings.”  Id. 
 175. No. 02 C 6608, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7475 (N.D. Ill. May 2, 2003). 
 176. Id. at *15–16. 
 177. Cause No. IP 99-1757-C H/G, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2686 (S.D. Ind. 2001). 
 178. Id. at *12. 
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courts to consider the decisions of other circuits critically,179 it should also be 
deferential to other circuits whenever possible.180 
However, the Seventh Circuit district court in Campbell v. Hall181 held that 
where a debt collection letter stated that a debtor had to dispute a debt in writing, 
effectuating the “plain meaning” of the law would not lead to an “absurd result[] 
because an oral dispute triggers multiple statutory protections” and “[a] statute 
need not contain parallel language in all of its subsections in order to be 
internally consistent.”182 
In Diamond v. Corcoran,183 a Sixth Circuit district court held there was no 
FDCPA violation where a debt collector required a written dispute based on 
similar deference to Graziano.184  However, another district court in the Sixth 
Circuit, in Mellinger v. Midwestern Audit Service, Inc., 185  held that § 
1692g(a)(3) does not require a writing, finding the Third Circuit’s opinion in 
Camacho persuasive. 186   The Court in Mellinger also pointed to the First 
Circuit’s holding, in Brady v. Credit Recovery Co.,187 that § 1692e(8) does not 
impose a writing requirement, where § 1692e(8) “on its face does not impose a 
writing requirement.”188 
                                                 
 179. Id. at *9–10 (citing Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Steel Co., 230 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 
2000)). 
 180. Castillo, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2686, at *9 (quoting Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 
1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds, 127 F.R.D. 509 (N.D. Ill. 1989)). 
 181. 624 F. Supp. 2d 991 (N.D. Ind. 2009). 
 182. Id. at 994–95, 999–1000 (internal quotations omitted).  The court noted that a number of 
Seventh Circuit district courts had not held there to be an implied writing requirement in § 
1692g(a)(3).  Id. at 1000. 
 183. No. 5:92-CV-36, 1992 WL 12647817 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 3, 1992). 
 184. Id. at *2.  The court stated that, 
Plaintiff . . . contends that . . . the FDCPA does not require plaintiff to dispute the debt in 
writing. . . . The [Third] Circuit held in [Graziano] that § 1692g(a)(3) contemplates that 
any dispute, to be effective, must be in writing, and therefore the letter’s requirement that 
disputes be in writing did not render the statutory notice invalid. 
Id. 
 185. No. 11-CV-11326, 2012 WL 405008 (E.D. Mich. 2012). 
 186. Id. at *4. 
 187. 160 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 188. Id. at 66.  The court in Brady also noted that “‘[i]n a statutory construction case . . . when 
a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute’s meaning in all but the most 
extraordinary circumstance is finished.’”  Id. (quoting Riva v. Commonwealth of Mass., 61 F.3d 
1003, 1007 (1st Cir. 1995)).  Moreover, the court held that where § 1692e(8) had a “much more 
limited effect [compared to § 1692b’s cease-collection provision]” of “requir[ing] a debt collector 
who knows or should know that a given debt is disputed to disclose its disputed status to persons 
inquiring about a consumer’s credit history[,]” the omission of a writing requirement “makes 
logical sense.”  Brady, 160 F.3d at at 67. 
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III.  EVALUATING THE CIRCUITS: BENEFITS AND SHORTFALLS 
A.  Oral Disputes Alone Do Not Protect Consumers 
Certainly, plain language and congressional intent are paramount 
considerations in statutory interpretation.189   The Supreme Court has stated 
“time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what 
it means and means in a statute what it says there.”190  Professor Elwin Griffith 
has said that, based on this strong tradition of deferring to the plain language of 
a statute, the inclusion of language in one part of a section in the FDCPA and its 
omission in another represents a “distinction” and “the plain language of the 
statute should carry the day” without “resort to [the statute’s] legislative 
history.”191 
However, proponents of reading a writing requirement into the law have 
substantial reason to be cautious of a plain language interpretation of § 
1692g(a)(3).192  Not only does a plain language reading of § 1692g(a)(3) bring 
into question the usefulness of an oral dispute that does not actually require a 
debt collector to do anything,193 but a debt collector who convinces a consumer 
to lodge an oral dispute may lead the consumer to forfeit his rights if the 
consumer, believing an oral dispute is sufficient to activate all his rights under 
the FDCPA, allows the thirty-day period to pass without also lodging a written 
dispute.194 
B.  Congress Favors Allowing Oral Disputes 
Concerns about the impact of a plain language reading of § 1692g(a)(3) 
notwithstanding, the Third Circuit in Caprio may not have paid due attention to 
the weight of legislative and administrative opinion with regard to the 
appropriateness of a writing requirement.195  First, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
                                                 
 189. See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Griffith, supra note 90, at 799.  Griffith argues for a plain language interpretation of § 
1692g(a)(3).  Id.  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that plain language should predominate where 
language is not ambiguous and that plain meaning “should be conclusive” except for where “the 
literal application [of a statute] will produce a result that is clearly at odds with the drafters[’] 
intent.”  Id.  See United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989).  See also Germain, 
503 U.S. at 253–54. 
 192. See infra notes 193–94 and accompanying text. 
 193. Griffith, supra note 90, at 800.  Griffith observed that the Third Circuit in Graziano was 
“bothered by the fact that even when the consumer disputes the debt orally, so as to call its validity 
into question, the debt collector still does not have any obligation to verify the debt.”  Id. 
 194. See id. at 798 n.237.  See also Miller v. Payco-Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482, 484 
(4th Cir. 1991) (noting that where a collection notice “demands ‘IMMEDIATE FULL PAYMENT’ 
and commands the consumer to ‘PHONE US TODAY,’” a consumer who actually made his dispute 
via telephone, as apparently requested by the notice, “could lose his rights under the [FDCPA]”). 
 195. See infra notes 196–99 and accompanying text. 
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held that courts should give deference to statutory interpretations of 
administrative agencies196 and “[u]nder normal circumstances,” a court should 
give “deference to a reasonable interpretation by the FTC if the statute [i]s 
ambiguous on the question” of the case.197  Therefore, Caprio should have taken 
into consideration the FTC’s unequivocal suggestion that Congress amend the 
FDCPA to permit oral disputes.198  Moreover, the fact that Congress amended § 
1692g(b) in 2006 to make a clear distinction between written and oral disputes 
rather starkly evidences the congressional intent behind the language.199 
C.  Consumers and Collectors Benefit from Oral Disputes and Statutory 
Clarity 
There are a few reasons why allowing oral disputes without obligating debt 
collectors to take any action might be useful to both consumers and debt 
collectors.  First, an oral dispute puts a debt collector on notice that a debt might 
not be accurate and this initial dispute could spur a debt collector to look into 
the debt, perhaps saving time and money in the long run.200  A provision for oral 
dispute provides an avenue for the consumer “to draw the debt collector’s 
attention to his concerns.” 201   This would be in line with the FDCPA’s 
“remedial” nature and the convention of applying a broad interpretation to the 
FDCPA in order to protect consumers.202 
The emergence of the circuit split on the question of whether § 1692g(a)(3) 
contains an implicit writing requirement has also added to the pressure on debt 
collection industry actors to parse the confusing provisions of the FDCPA.203  
Professors Laurie Lucas and Alvin Harrell suggest that “the circuits would be 
better served if Congress would clarify some of the [FDCPA’s] vexing 
                                                 
 196. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) 
(holding that “considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction 
of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer”). 
 197. Elwin Griffith, The Meaning of Language and the Elements of Fairness in the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 13, 21 (1995). 
 198. U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 129, at 12–13. 
 199. See supra note 127–28 and accompanying text. 
 200. See Elwin Griffith, The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act — Reconciling the Interests 
of Consumers and Debt Collectors, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 46–47 (1999); Griffith, supra note 88, 
at 800. 
 201. Griffith, supra note 90, at 800–01. 
 202. Gage, supra note 120, at 287. 
 203. See Laurie A. Lucas et al., Circuit Conflicts Create Uncertainty for Debt Collectors Under 
the FDCPA, 69 BUS. LAW. 623, 623 (2014) (explaining that the circuit split is one of many that 
“exacerbate [disagreement] on substantive issues” and create a “need for additional guidance . . . 
[on] the evolving complexities of the FDCPA”). 
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issues.”204  One commentator has suggested that ambiguities in the FDCPA have 
led to “regulatory inefficiency [which] deleteriously affects both consumers and 
debt collectors [by] conflat[ing] substantive consumer abuses with technical 
compliance violations.”205  It is untenable for creditors to be fully compliant with 
the FDCPA and creditors are exposed to legal liability because of “courts’ 
varying and unsettled interpretations of the [FDCPA’s] most ill-crafted and 
outdated provisions.”206 
Creditors who operate multistate businesses are the most at risk for 
noncompliance, whether intentional or accidental.207  Some scholars suggest that 
to avoid unintentionally violating the FDCPA, businessmen operating multistate 
debt collection operations should simply resort to drafting two validation 
notices: one for the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits that “avoid any 
suggestion that written notice of the dispute is required” and one for the Third 
Circuit that requires written notice.208  Debt collectors, they suggest, should “be 
ready to switch notices at any time[.]”209 
One criticism of § 1692g is that it may not always “convey an effective 
message to the least sophisticated consumer,” especially because the law does 
not require the debt collector’s statements in the 1692g notice to be in a specific 
order. 210   An unscrupulous debt collector could capitalize on this lack of 
ordering to confuse the consumer by referencing the necessity of a written 
dispute in § 1692g(a)(4) before mentioning the dispute in § 1692g(a)(3) to lead 
a consumer to believe that a written dispute is required.211  This creates a conflict 
for debt collectors who may continue collections during the thirty-day period, 
                                                 
 204. Laurie A. Lucas & Alvin C. Harrell, The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: 2006 Review 
of Appellate Cases, 61 BUS. LAW. 941, 948 (2006).  Congressional action to rectify ambiguities in 
the FDCPA would “establish consistency across the circuits.”  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 205. Bremner, supra note 4, at 1556. 
 206. See id. at 1581–82.  Bremner argues that “a debt collector must walk an unnecessarily 
fine line to avoid liability, and ultimately its guilt is less a product of its actual conduct than an 
arbitrary determination dependent upon the jurisdiction in which the claim is filed.”  Id. at 1583. 
 207. See John L. Culhane, Jr., Call or Write for FDCPA Notice? Depends on the State, LAW360 
(Mar. 7, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/515165/call-or-write-for-fdcapa-notice-
depends-on-the-state. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Griffith, supra note 90, at 801–02.  Griffith notes that “by putting the phrase ‘by notifying 
us in writing to that effect’ after the word ‘dispute,’” a collector may convince a consumer that only 
one dispute process is available under the validation mechanism.  Id.  Yet, Griffith notes, “there is 
no language that explains that there is [a] difference in meaning” between disputes made to avert a 
collector’s presumption of a debt’s validity and disputes made to take advantage of other rights 
against collectors.  Id. at 802. 
 211. Id.  See also Goldberg v. Winston & Morrone, P.C., 95 Civ. 9282 (LAK), 1997 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 3521, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 1997) (holding that whether the defendant’s reordering of 
the § 1692g(a)(3) and (4) statements would “mislead the ‘least sophisticated consumer’” is an issue 
of fact). 
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but who must also notify consumers of their rights.212  Thus, the FDCPA’s 
ambiguity harms consumers and ethical debt collectors—two groups the law was 
intended to benefit.213 
IV.  CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE FDCPA TO EXPLICITLY PERMIT ORAL 
AND WRITTEN DISPUTES, WHILE REQUIRING COLLECTORS TO INCLUDE A 
DISCLAIMER ABOUT THE EFFECT OF BOTH METHODS OF DISPUTE 
In order to resolve the circuit split on whether § 1692g(a)(3) implies a 
requirement that a consumer dispute a debt in writing, Congress should amend 
§ 1692g(a)(3) to state that a debt collector must inform a consumer that he may 
dispute a debt in writing or orally, but that an oral dispute does not replace a 
written dispute for purposes of availing oneself of rights otherwise invoked by 
written disputes.  Griffith has previously proposed amending the FDCPA to 
clearly permit oral disputes 214  and to have such a dispute compel the debt 
collector to verify the debt or cease collection of the debt.215  However, the 
additional inclusion of a clear disclaimer requiring the debt collector to explain 
to the consumer the distinction between written and oral disputes in terms of the 
protections such disputes provide would benefit both consumers and debt 
collectors enormously.216 
A.  Strict Liability and Ambiguity Do Not Mix 
The FDCPA is a strict liability law at its core.217  The law should be as 
unambiguous as possible if debt collectors can be sued for technical violations 
in order to avoid needlessly exposing debt collectors to liability. 218   This 
amendment would also put an end to the debate over whether the FDCPA 
                                                 
 212. Griffith, supra note 90, at 825–26. 
 213. See Hoffman, supra note 26, at 551–52. 
 214. See e.g. Elwin Griffith, The Peculiarity of Language in the Debt Collection Process: The 
Impact of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 673, 732 (2008) (arguing that 
“there is no good reason why section 1692g(a)(3) should not be amended to clarify the point that 
the consumer’s oral dispute of the debt is sufficient”); Elwin Griffith, The Challenge of 
Communicating with the Consumer and Validating the Debt Under the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 119 (2006) (stating that “[i]f the statute allowed the consumer 
to dispute the debt orally [under both] (a)(3) and (a)(4), then there would be no argument about the 
current difference in language”); Griffith, supra note 90, at 802 (contending that “Congress . . . 
should clarify its position by amending the statute”). 
 215. See e.g. Griffith, supra note 200, at 47 (suggesting “[t]he consumer’s lot would be made 
easier if the statute required the collector to either verify the debt or cease all collection activities”). 
 216. See id. at 47–48. 
 217. See Vartan S. Madoyan, Comment, Attorneys Beware: Jerman v. Carlisle Holds You 
Liable for Technical Legal Errors Under the FDCPA, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (2011). 
 218. See Bremner, supra note 4, at 1581 (observing that “the structure and ambiguity of the 
FDCPA has made it relatively easy for inventive lawyers to form highly technical, cognizable 
claims against debt collectors, even where their clients suffer no actual harm”). 
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encourages excessive litigation of technical violations.219  Some scholars argue 
that a “cottage industry” has arisen around “exploiting the ambiguities” of the 
FDCPA to “coerce collection agencies” to abandon valid claims. 220   Other 
scholars argue that there are no technical violations under strict liability statutes, 
merely lapses in compliance.221  If the former school of thought is accurate, 
clarifying § 1692g(a)(3) should reduce debt collectors’ exposure to technical 
litigation.222  If the latter school of thought is correct, the end product of the 
proposed amendment will be a strict liability law that is more amenable to 
encouraging debt collector compliance.223 
B.  A Disclaimer Will Solve Unique Problems of Ambiguity 
Requiring debt collectors to inform consumers that an oral dispute is not a 
substitute for a written dispute (for the purpose of activating rights explicitly 
activated via written dispute will prevent the possibility that the debt collector) 
will confuse the consumer by reordering the statements required by § 
1692g(a)(3) and (4).224   It will also make the consumer think twice before 
accidentally forfeiting his rights by believing an oral dispute is enough to stop 
collections and compel the debt collector to verify the debt.225  It is a solution 
tailored precisely to assist the least sophisticated consumer.  This amendment 
would also reduce the compliance burden and liability exposure of debt 
collectors operating multistate businesses who will otherwise have to coordinate 
and update their 1692g notices as courts come to different conclusions on 
whether consumers must dispute a debt in writing under § 1692g(a)(3).226 
                                                 
 219. See infra notes 220–23 and accompanying text. 
 220. Hoffman, supra note 26, at 561–62. 
 221. Anderson, supra note 109, at 28–29. 
 222. See Bremner, supra note 4, at 1564 (arguing that strict liability under the FDCPA is 
“inefficient,” with “abusive debt collectors gain[ing] a competitive advantage” because there is “no 
practical differentiation between the most egregious consumer abuses and mundane technical 
violations that do not cause consumers any actual harm”).  Also, attorneys are “subject to strict 
liability . . . for otherwise honest errors” and therefore “may strongly hesitate before advocating 
zealously for their [creditor] clients.”  Madoyan, supra note 217, at 1092. 
 223. See Bremner, supra note 4, at 1556 (arguing that “clarifying existing statutory 
ambiguities” would help “ethical debt collectors” by allowing them to “profit through compliance 
and capture greater market share”). 
 224. See Griffith, supra note 90, at 802. 
 225. Id. at 798 n.237.  See e.g. Rhoades v. W. Va. Credit Bureau Reporting Servs., Inc., 96 F. 
Supp. 2d 528, 532 (2000) (finding that statements such as “phone us today” could confuse “even a 
somewhat sophisticated . . . consumer”). 
 226. Culhane, supra note 207. 
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C.  The Amendment Gives Weight to Both Sides of the Circuit Split 
Oral disputes allow consumers to “draw the debt collector’s attention to” 
debts227 and would help consumers “who may have some difficulty with making 
a timely written challenge.”228   At the same time, a writing would avoid a 
“source of potential conflicts”229 and protect consumers from forfeiting their 
rights.230  Amending § 1692g(a)(3) to explicitly permit both written and oral 
disputes while disclaiming the hazards of relying on an oral dispute will 
incorporate the best ideas of both sides of the circuit split.  It will allow 
consumers greater flexibility in disputing debt and will effectuate the 
recommendation of the FTC and the apparent intent of Congress in drafting and 
amending § 1692g while also avoiding unnecessary litigation. 231  Adding a 
disclaimer will remind consumers of the distinction between oral and written 
disputes, preventing debt collectors from confusing consumers by reordering the 
consumers’ FDCPA rights in the 1692g notice.232 
V.  CONCLUSION 
An important consumer right under the FDCPA has become mired in a circuit 
split because of conflicting philosophies of statutory construction.  While 
circuits permitting oral disputes under § 1692g(a)(3) are faithful to the FDCPA’s 
language, history, and purpose, the Third Circuit’s cautions in requiring written 
disputes should not go unheeded.  Amending § 1692g(a)(3) to explicitly permit 
oral and written disputes while requiring debt collectors to include a disclaimer 
in their 1692g notices that an oral dispute does not entitle a consumer to the same 
rights as a written dispute will do justice to the FDCPA and the conclusions of 
the Ninth, Second, and Fourth Circuits while incorporating the Third Circuit’s 
salient concerns, and closing the door on a controversy that should be resolved 
sooner rather than later for the benefit of consumers and debt collectors. 
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